FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA — Soldiers with the U.S. Army’s 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team conducted a training rotation at Fort Irwin, California, last month focused on integrating new technologies and tactics to counter unmanned aerial systems. The exercise emphasized combined arms operations that fused drones, electronic warfare, and traditional armored vehicles to address what senior leaders describe as a critical vulnerability on the modern battlefield.

During the rotation, the brigade launched loitering munitions, reconnaissance drones, and electronic effects against a simulated enemy while coordinating with M1 Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and light vehicles. Soldiers also used Infantry Squad Vehicles to maneuver into position and deploy drones, practiced logistics replenishment using unmanned aerial systems, and employed tactical dispersion—forward scouts spread out across terrain to reduce the enemy’s ability to mass drone effects on concentrated formations.

Lt. Col. Joseph Steadman, commander of the 6th Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment, identified unmanned aerial systems as the most urgent operational shortfall facing armored units. “The inability to defeat drones counts as the biggest capability gap that we have as an Army Brigade Combat Team in order to maintain maneuver,” Steadman said. He added, “If we can’t do something about the enemy’s UAS and do it rapidly, then we’re not going to be successful at continuing to maneuver.”

Col. Alexis Perez-Cruz, commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, echoed those concerns while defending the continued relevance of heavy armored forces. “I don’t think at our level … we have enough of the technology,” she said. Perez-Cruz acknowledged that lessons from ongoing conflicts are accelerating real-world testing of counter-drone methods “elsewhere in real life” and noted, “I think we’re just scratching the surface on counter-UAS.”

Despite the challenges, Perez-Cruz emphasized that armor remains indispensable under specific battlefield conditions. “The armor branch remains the only force capable of delivering decisive, large-scale shock and terrain seizure when windows of opportunity open,” she said. She elaborated that “the modern battlefield may limit some maneuver, but when deception, electronic warfare, firepower creates even just brief openings, armor formations are still the only elements that can rapidly penetrate, exploit, and we hold ground at scale.” She also confirmed that the brigade’s combined arms composition—including engineers, infantry, and air defense units—is designed to prevent stagnation and secure key terrain.

The training reflects broader institutional efforts to adapt to drone warfare. The U.S. Army is updating its doctrine to include specific guidance for tank platoons on defending against unmanned threats and investing in next-generation platforms like the M1E3 tank and the XM30, which will replace the Bradley fighting vehicle. These developments come as the Russia-Ukraine war has exposed vulnerabilities in heavy armor: cheap drones have successfully attacked weak points on tanks from multiple angles, prompting Ukrainian forces to retrofit Abrams tanks and other vehicles with protective “cop-cages” to shield crew compartments.

Even as the Army pursues technical and doctrinal solutions, gaps persist in fielded capabilities. During a recent evaluation at Fort Carson, Colorado, sub-units of the 4th Infantry Division testing the Army’s Next Generation Command and Control prototype reported lacking organic counter-drone systems. Meanwhile, the Army’s top civilian leader harshly criticized existing equipment, describing the Dronebuster handheld counter-unmanned aerial system as extremely ineffective. At the Pentagon level, Joint Interagency Task Force 401 is working to accelerate the deployment of counter-drone technology, revise policy, and foster innovation across the military.

The brigade’s training also engaged with strategic critiques of the armor branch. Retired Lt. Col. Amos Fox published an essay in the Small Wars Journal warning that armor could “be dead by 2035” if it fails to evolve, arguing that the community is hindered by insularity and an outdated “maneuver-centric fetish.” Perez-Cruz called the essay “thought provoking” and noted that both her leadership team and Fox’s analysis identify the air-ground littoral zone—where air and ground domains intersect—as decisive terrain for future heavy-unit operations.

The 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team’s exercise illustrates the U.S. Army’s urgent effort to preserve the viability of heavy maneuver forces amid a drone-dominated battlefield. With senior leaders acknowledging a lack of sufficient counter-unmanned aerial systems technology and ongoing conflicts demonstrating the lethality of inexpensive drones against armored vehicles, the service is simultaneously refreshing doctrine, testing new equipment, and rethinking combined arms integration. The outcome of these efforts will shape whether traditional armored formations can maintain relevance in high-intensity combat against near-peer adversaries.