Adm. Charles Richard, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has asserted that the United States faces a deterrence gap with Russia and China due to a lack of theater-range nuclear weapons. In a 2022 letter to Congress, Richard stated that “a deterrence and assurance gap exists” between the United States and its nuclear adversaries.

Richard expanded on this argument in a 2025 essay co-authored with Franklin Miller and Robert Peters, writing that America's “lack of proportional non-strategic, non-ballistic, theater range systems could cause autocrats in Beijing, Moscow, or even Pyongyang to conclude they cannot only threaten to use their [tactical nuclear weapons] for coercive purposes” but can employ such systems “to achieve operational advantage and ultimately victory in a conflict.”

Some nuclear strategists, military officers, and lawmakers share Richard’s concern. Russia and China possess theater-range nuclear weapons with comparatively small yields, which are thought to lower the threshold for their use. In response, Richard proposed developing a low-yield, non-ballistic U.S. nuclear system to close the perceived gap.

The U.S. has taken steps toward expanding flexible nuclear options. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review asserted that “Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression.” In 2020, the National Nuclear Security Administration built and the U.S. Navy began fielding W76-2 low-yield warheads on ballistic missile submarines. The warhead was intended to disabuse adversaries of the idea that “employment of low-yield nuclear weapons will give them an advantage over the United States.”

The broader U.S. nuclear modernization program includes plans for a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile. Additionally, the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission recommended developing additional options to deter limited nuclear use, with an emphasis on theater systems in the Asia-Pacific region.

Historical context includes past warnings of strategic vulnerability, such as John F. Kennedy’s 1960 campaign claim of a “missile gap” with the Soviet Union—later determined to be unfounded—and 1970s-era assertions of a “window of vulnerability” promoted by the Committee on the Present Danger and the “Team B” intelligence panel. Russian and Chinese officials argue that superior U.S. ballistic missile defenses have altered strategic equilibrium, driving their nuclear modernization efforts. Public assessments also note that Russian theater-level nuclear systems significantly underperformed during the Ukraine conflict.