The Government Accountability Office reported in 2025 that Lockheed Martin’s production of the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) hypersonic missile is failing to meet planned rates due to persistent manufacturing and quality-control problems. The issues are jeopardizing joint fielding schedules for both the Navy and Army, which share the missile system and its production line.

Lockheed Martin, the U.S. aerospace and defense manufacturer selected as prime contractor for both the Navy’s CPS and the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon in 2023, is currently capable of building only six to seven missiles annually—well below the Navy’s target production rate of 12 per year. According to the GAO, “Navy data indicate that the contractor facility operations are not currently able to meet demand, making it difficult for Lockheed Martin to keep production commitments.”

The GAO report identified four primary factors contributing to the production shortfall: parts contamination, incomplete production kits, workforce gaps, and design complexity. Navy and Army officials specifically found that Lockheed Martin used contaminated thermal protection coating materials and incomplete parts kits, both of which caused production delays. The GAO elaborated that “parts are sometimes missing from kits, which are groups of all the parts necessary to complete a portion of the missile.” When parts are missing, “it slows production as these missing parts need to be borrowed from other missile kits.” In some cases, “the contractor had to partially disassemble missiles in production to address issues with parts or incomplete assembly kits.”

Workforce instability has compounded these manufacturing setbacks. Lockheed Martin has experienced high employee turnover as technicians moved to other programs or left the company entirely. Although the company expanded its manufacturing workforce from roughly 60 employees to about 80, Army officials told the GAO that new workers require nearly a year before they can perform independently. As of March 2025, the direct labor required to assemble each missile remained above the level necessary to achieve planned production rates.

Quality assurance failures have been documented since at least 2023. A Navy audit of the production facility that year noted a lack of adequate parts inspection, multiple instances of untagged expired materials such as adhesives, and numerous cases where quality assurance steps were not followed. Additionally, work instructions provided to technicians were overly complex and written like engineering specifications rather than practical manufacturing guidance, further hindering production efficiency.

These operational shortcomings have forced delays in critical program milestones. The GAO reported that missing, inconsistent, and unclear work standards for missile production led the Army and Navy to postpone several key schedule targets. Because the two services jointly developed the hypersonic missile and share a single production line, manufacturing problems affect both the CPS and the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon—also known as Dark Eagle—simultaneously.

The Army began fielding its first Dark Eagle battery at the end of 2025 and expects to deliver a second battery in early 2027. The Navy, meanwhile, plans to deploy its hypersonic weapon on Zumwalt-class destroyers beginning in 2027 and intends to integrate the missile onto Block V Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s. Lockheed Martin is responsible for development and integration of the missiles, while Dynetics manufactures the common hypersonic glide body used by both services.

Despite the challenges, Lockheed Martin has begun implementing corrective actions, though the GAO emphasized it is too early to determine whether these efforts will significantly improve production. The company stated, “We are enhancing production and manufacturing processes to deliver for the Arsenal of Freedom faster.” It added, “We’re confident in the quality of our capabilities and are working across the industrial base to strengthen supply chain resilience.” Regarding specific questions about the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, Lockheed Martin noted, “Specific questions regarding the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon system should be directed to the Office of the Secretary of War.”

The production failures come amid massive planned investments: the Army and Navy together intend to spend more than $50 billion on their hypersonic initiatives, including development, testing, and fielding. The Navy estimates the CPS program alone will cost approximately $41 billion over its lifecycle—up from $31 billion in 2020—while individual missiles are now expected to cost between $63 million and $71 million, averaging roughly $67 million each. The Army plans to spend more than $10 billion to procure 48 Long Range Hypersonic Weapon missiles and associated ground equipment.

The GAO concluded that the Defense Department lacks a comprehensive strategy for coordinating investments across the Navy and Army’s shared hypersonics enterprise. It recommended that the Pentagon develop and regularly review a department-wide strategy to align investment decisions across the shared portfolio. “Without a comprehensive strategy to guide investment decisions, it is unlikely that the Army and the Navy will be well-positioned to make decisions across the portfolio of programs that result in efficiently delivering the CPS capability at planned cost and schedule targets,” the agency stated.