US — The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention downsized its cyclospora outbreak response laboratory from 11 staff members to three amid a broader agency-wide workforce reduction, even as a multistate outbreak of cyclosporiasis has potentially sickened nearly 7,000 people across the United States. The CDC has identified lettuce from Taylor Farms as a possible source of the outbreak, which includes more than 4,300 cases in Michigan alone.

The cyclospora lab is part of the CDC’s parasitic diseases division, which performs genetic testing on stool samples to identify strains of the parasite and help determine disease clusters. Positive stool samples are first sent to state health departments for analysis, which then forward them to the CDC for genetic testing. Epidemiologists at state health departments interview patients to identify foods consumed within the past two weeks—a critical window since symptoms of cyclospora infection can take a week or two to appear after exposure. That patient interview data is sent to the CDC, where epidemiologists look for commonalities among cases to trace outbreak sources.

Joel Barratt, who previously led the CDC lab that responds to cyclospora outbreaks, left the agency voluntarily in September after eight years. Barratt is now a molecular parasitologist and assistant professor at Emory University School of Medicine. He described the work environment at the CDC as having “become a hostile work environment” prior to his departure. He also recounted the strain of workforce constraints, saying, “I had to sit down with many people in my office and tell them, ‘Look, I'm really sorry we can't renew you because of the hiring freezes.’”

Barratt warned that the reduction in staffing will impair the agency’s ability to respond effectively. “Based on simple math, these outbreak responses—which require rapid, timely responses—are going to be greatly diminished,” he said. He added that cyclospora is only one concern among many, stating, “Cyclospora is just one piece. It's making the news right now, but there are other, more dangerous pathogens than cyclospora.”

The downsizing of the cyclospora lab occurred as part of a broader reduction of approximately 3,000 employees at the CDC since January 2025, representing roughly a quarter of the agency’s total workforce. The estimate of these workforce reductions was compiled by the American Federation of Government Employees Local 2883, which represents CDC workers. The reduction includes both layoffs and employees who accepted the Trump administration’s buyout program. The specific size of the cuts at Barratt’s former lab was first reported by Nature.

Amira Roess, a professor of global health and epidemiology at George Mason University and a former CDC epidemic intelligence service officer, criticized the timing and scale of the cuts. “Even before the cuts of 2025, we've known that our public health surveillance systems and our food safety systems leave a lot to be desired,” Roess said. She emphasized the operational impact of reduced staffing, stating, “When it comes to investigating outbreaks, we have a lot of the techniques down. We know what to do, but if we don't have personnel, a lot of it can't get done.”

The cyclospora outbreak response relies on a coordinated system involving state health departments and the CDC’s specialized lab capacity. Genetic testing at the CDC helps confirm whether patients are infected with the same strain, enabling epidemiologists to link cases into clusters and trace contaminated food sources. With the lab now operating with less than a third of its former staff, that capacity is significantly constrained during an active outbreak affecting thousands.

The workforce reductions come amid longstanding concerns about the resilience of U.S. public health infrastructure. Experts like Roess and Barratt argue that even well-established outbreak investigation protocols cannot function without adequate personnel. The current outbreak—already one of the largest cyclosporiasis incidents in U.S. history—illustrates the real-world consequences of diminished laboratory and epidemiological resources at a time when rapid response is critical.